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Optimal redistribution when different workers are indistinguishable

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Author Info
Maurice Marchand
Pierre Pestieau
María Racionero

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Abstract

Using the standard non linear income and commodity taxation framework, we examine the optimal policy to be adopted when the same labour disutility can receive two opposite interpretations: taste for leisure and activity limitation. In the absence of complete information about individual characteristics, an income tax does not allow distinguishing lazy from handicapped individuals. One may rely, however, on a combination of commodity and income taxes to redistribute from the former to the latter when they differ in their preferences for commodities.

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File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v36n4/06.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 36 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 911-922
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:36:y:2003:i:4:p:911-922

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. BOADWAY, R. & MARCHAND, M. & PESTIEAU, P. & del MAR RACIONERO, M., 2001. "Optimal redistribution with heterogeneous preferences for leisure," CORE Discussion Papers 2001025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Katherine Cuff, 2000. "Optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 149-174, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Disability Testing and Retirement," IDEI Working Papers 281, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Louis Kaplow, 2004. "On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income Taxation is Not Optimal," NBER Working Papers 10407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Laurence JACQUET, 2009. "Take it or Leave it : Optimal Transfer Programs, Monitoring and Takeup," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2009003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  4. Louis Kaplow, 2008. "Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Louis Kaplow, 2006. "Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation," NBER Working Papers 12339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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