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Nash-Walras equilibria

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Author Info

  • GHOSAL, Sayantan

    (Department of Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of)

  • POLEMARCHAKIS , Heracles

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

At a Nash - Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, NashWalras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained Pareto suboptimal: a transfer of revenue need not suffice for a Pareto improvement in welfare.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1995080.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 1995
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1995080

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Related research

Keywords: Nash; Walras; equilibrium; determinacy; optimality;

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Cited by:
  1. MINELLI, Enrico & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles, 1999. "Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy," CORE Discussion Papers 1999043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Andrés Carvajal, 2003. "Testable Restrictions og General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 003556, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  3. Deb, Rahul, 2009. "A testable model of consumption with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1804-1816, July.
  4. Deb, Rahul, 2008. "Interdependent Preferences, Potential Games and Household Consumption," MPRA Paper 6818, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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