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Innovación e incumbent failure: Una ilustración usando la industria de las telecomunicaciones en Colombia

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  • Hernán Herrera Echeverry

Abstract

Se realiza un análisis de los determinantes del incumbent failure que surgen de la interdependencia competitiva. Se utiliza herramientas proporcionadas por la teoría de juegos (backward induction y el análisis de estrategias conjuntas en juegos de senalización) para determinar los incentivos de una firma establecida a invertir en una innovación. Para efectos de dar ilustración a la argumentación desarrollada se utiliza el caso de Telecom y la entrada de la telefonía móvil celular a Colombia. Se concluye que la participación en el mercado existente y la magnitud esperada de la demanda que permanecerá tecnología antigua, son barreras para que una firma establecida decida invertir en una innovación. La probabilidad de que una firma establecida invierta en la innovación es inversa a la probabilidad de éxito del entrante, al monto de dicha inversión y a la magnitud de los beneficios que la firma establecida obtendría con su producto actual, si el entrante tiene éxito. ***** This paper provides an analysis of the determinants of the Incumbent failure arising from the interdependence competitive. It is used tools provided by game theory (backward induction and analysis of joint strategies in games of signaling) for determining the incentives to invest in innovation for an incumbent firm. For illustration purposes, the case of Telecom and the entry of mobile cellular in Colombia is used. We conclude that participation in the existing market and the expected magnitude of demand that will remain old technology, are barriers to set a firm decides to invest in innovation. The probability of an incumbent firm to invest in innovation is inverse to the likelihood of success of the entrant, the amount of such investment and the magnitude of the benefits that would accrue from the firm established its current product, if the entrant is successful.

Suggested Citation

  • Hernán Herrera Echeverry, 2008. "Innovación e incumbent failure: Una ilustración usando la industria de las telecomunicaciones en Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 11811, Universidad EAFIT.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000122:011811
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Michael Conlin & Vrinda Kadiyali, 2006. "Entry‐Deterring Capacity in the Texas Lodging Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 167-185, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation; incumbent failure; Game theory; Signaling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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