Bogotá: the collapse of a political machine
AbstractIn Bogotá the 1991 reforms obstructed a market for votes. Clientelism lost its effectiveness; citizens developed a vote of opinion and the city showed an outstanding performance in the provision of public goods and social services. This story is illustrated with a novel panel data at the neighborhood voting precinct level from 1988 to 2003. An interesting episode exposes the changing class preferentes of Bogotá citizens for each of its mayors. However, the main result is the structural break caused by the reforms. Prior to 1991, the areas with the most exposure to clientelism generated a greater percentage of votes for traditional parties and obtained a greater coverage of social services; since 1991, both relationships are no longer true. A political machine collapses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE in its series DOCUMENTOS CEDE with number 004011.
Date of creation: 09 Aug 2007
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-09-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HIS-2007-09-24 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- The Looting of BogotÃ¡
by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in Why Nations Fail on 2013-05-10 15:22:00
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