Theoretical models of the political budget cycle suggest that electoral manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall budget or the deficit, and that the form and extent of this manipulation depend on the fiscal preferences of voters. These insights, however, are often overlooked in empirical studies. In this paper, I use data on government expenditures and election outcomes in Colombia to provide an integrated analysis of voting behavior and the pre-electoral dynamics of government spending. I emphasize potential changes in the composition, rather than the size, of the budget. I find that components of the budget that can be identified with targeted spending grow, and that non-targeted spending contracts, in the year preceding an election. Consistently, I find that voters reward the preelection increases in targeted spending, but punish incumbents who run high deficits before the election.// Según algunos modelos teóricos, la manipulación electoral del gasto público puede tomar la forma de cambios en la composición del mismo, posiblemente sin afectar el déficit. La teoría también señala que la magnitud de cambios electorales en el gasto depende de las preferencias fiscales de los votantes. Este trabajo utiliza datos de gasto público y resultados electorales en municipios colombianos en un análisis integrado del comportamiento de los votantes y la dinámica del gasto público en periodos electorales. El hincapié es en la composición del presupuesto más que en su tamaño. Se encuentra que antes de elecciones los componentes del presupuesto que son más visibles y favorecidos por los votantes aumentan, mientras otros tipos de gasto caen. De manera congruente las perspectivas electorales futuras del partido en el poder son favorecidas por incrementos electorales del gasto “preferido”, mientras que incrementos electorales del déficit tienen el efecto contrario.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures