We report on six large-scale nancial markets experiments that were designed to test two of the most basic propositions of modern asset pricing theory, namely, that the interaction between risk averse agents in a competitive market leads to equilibration, and that, in equilibrium, risk premia are solely determined by covariance with aggregate risk. We designed the experiments within the framework suggested by two theoretical models, namely, Arrow and Debreu's complete-markets model, and the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This framework enabled us to measure how far our markets were from equilibrium at any point in time, thereby allowing us to gauge the success of the models. The distance measures do not require knowledge of the (uncontrollable) level and dispersion of risk aversion among subjects, and adjust for the impact of progressive trading on the eventual equilibrium. Unlike in our earlier, thin-markets experiments, we discovered swift convergence towards equilibrium prices of Arrow and Debreu's model or the CAPM. This discovery is significant, because subjects always lacked the information to deliberately set asset prices using either model. Sometimes, however, the equilibrium was not found to be robust, with markets readily veering away, apparently as a result of deviations of subjective beliefs from objective probabilities. Still, we find evidence that this did not destroy the tendency for markets to equilibrate as predicted by the theory. In each experiment, we formally test and reject the hypothesis that prices are a random walk, in favor of stochastic convergence towards CAPM and Arrow Debreu equilibrium.
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number
1070.
Length: 48 pages Date of creation: Jan 2000 Date of revision: Publication status: Published: Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1070
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Gallant, A. Ronald & Tauchen, George, 1996.
"Which Moments to Match?,"
Econometric Theory,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(04), pages 657-681, October.
[Downloadable!]
Gourieroux, C & Monfort, A & Renault, E, 1993.
"Indirect Inference,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(S), pages S85-118, Suppl. De.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Gourieroux, C. & Monfort, A. & Renault, E., 1992.
"Indirect Inference,"
Papers
92.279, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
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