A Tale of Two Ports
AbstractThis paper examines how two geographically separated ports compete for a market consisting of manufacturing firms located between the two ports. There is a firm in each port, and these two firms, taking the infrastructure provided by their governments as given, compete in a Bertrand sense. The governments, however, can also compete in terms of investment in infrastructure. This paper shows that there are cases in which both the firm and the government in the port that has a longer history in the market may have the first mover advantage. In particular, the government can provide a credible threat by overinvesting in infrastructure. Nous analysons un jeu entre deux ports, dont le premier a l'avantage de prendre sa décision avant son adversaire. Dans chaque port, il y a un cartel qui s'occupe de la distribution des biens produits par des établissements localisés entre les deux ports. Les cartels prennent comme donnée l'infrastructure construite par les gouvernements respectifs qui se font concurrence. On démontre que l'un des deux gouvernements a intérêt à utiliser la stratégie de préemption en investissant très généreusement en infrastructure.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2001s-48.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2020 rue University, 25e étage, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2A5
Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
More information through EDIRC
Economic geography; inter-government rivalry; Géographie économique; rivalité intergouvernementale;
Other versions of this item:
- Ngo Van Long & Kar-yiu Wong, 1999. "A Tale of Two Ports," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0037, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Ngo Van Long & Kar-yiu Wong, 1999. "A Tale of Two Ports," Working Papers 0037, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
- R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & THISSE, Jacques-François, .
"On Hotelling's "Stability in competition","
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-385, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Edward L. Glaeser & Hedi D. Kallal & Jose A. Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, 1991.
"Growth in Cities,"
NBER Working Papers
3787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986.
"Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglass C. North, 1955. "Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 243.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1996.
"R&D Spillovers and Location Choice under Cournot Rivalry,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Van Long, N. & Soubeyran, A., 1996. "R&D Spillovers and Location Choice Under Cournot Rivalry," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96a35, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Masahisa Fujita & Paul Krugman & Anthony J. Venables, 2001. "The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262561476, January.
- Fujita, M. & Thisse, J.-F., .
"Economics of agglomeration,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1250, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Fujita, Masahisa & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1996. "Economics of Agglomeration," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 339-378, December.
- Fujita,Masahisa & Thisse,Jacques-Francois, 2002. "Economics of Agglomeration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521801386, December.
- Fujita,Masahisa & Thisse,Jacques-Francois, 2002. "Economics of Agglomeration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521805247, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.