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Direct Distribution of Oil Revenues in Venezuela: A Viable Alternative?

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  • Pedro L. Rodríguez, José R. Morales, Fancisco J. Monaldi

Abstract

Venezuela is a textbook example of a resource-dependent country—between 1950 and 2008, oil generated over a trillion dollars of income for the state. Nevertheless, Venezuela currently combines an economy that is stagnant, despite high oil prices, with an increasingly authoritarian government. The authors argue that large oil rents that accrue to the state, together with a lack of formal and transparent mechanisms to facilitate citizen oversight, are a large part of the problem. They consider the nature of the fiscal contract between the Venezuelan government and its people. This has been characterized by increasing discretion of the executive; only a small share of the rents is now subject to political oversight within the framework of the budgetary system. The authors consider the case for direct distribution of rents, distinguishing it from a populist approach to transfers as effected through Venezuela’s misiones. They also report on focus group discussions of the direct- distribution approach and the political viability of direct transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro L. Rodríguez, José R. Morales, Fancisco J. Monaldi, 2012. "Direct Distribution of Oil Revenues in Venezuela: A Viable Alternative?," Working Papers 306, Center for Global Development.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Satti, Saqlain Latif & Farooq, Abdul & Loganathan, Nanthakumar & Shahbaz, Muhammad, 2014. "Empirical evidence on the resource curse hypothesis in oil abundant economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 421-429.
    2. Yeltsin Tafur & Eric Lilford & Roberto F. Aguilera, 2022. "Assessing the risk of foreign investment within the petroleum sector of South America," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(6), pages 1-32, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    oil; natural resources; accountability; transfers; Venezuela; governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

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