We analyze the microeconomic determinants of cross-border bank acquisitions in 16 transition economies over the period 1996-2006. By using a latent class discrete choice model we explicitly incorporate the macroeconomic and institutional heterogeneity of the transition economies into our analysis. We find that foreign banks target relatively large and efficient banks when they enter transition economies with weak institutions. This evidence provides support for the market power hypothesis. However, when foreign banks enter more developed transition economies that have made progress in economic reform, they acquire less efficient banks. This result is in line with the efficiency hypothesis.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 2372.