On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable Contributions
AbstractWe develop a model that allows for public goods and status signaling through charitable contributions. This model provides a unified framework in which contributions are driven both by altruism and status signaling. We use this setup to re-examine the conventional practice of rendering a favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1900.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
optimal taxation; re-distribution; charitable contributions; inequality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
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