Opaque governance, special purpose vehicles, and the preacher´s waiver
AbstractThis paper argues that special purpose vehicles, SPVs, are two-edged financial constructs whose bad edge consists in conveying opaque governance, whereas its good one amounts to interesting financial engineering. Firstly, the notion of opaque governance is highlighted, to focus next on SPVs and their governance. Afterwards, the paper delves into collateralized debt obligations and their facilitators, the offshore locations. Last, the failing role of some regulators and gatekeepers is emphasized with the purpose of setting up new measures to prevent them from claiming the Preacher’s waiver.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 481.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
opaque governance; special purpose vehicles; collateralized debt obligations; offshore locations; gatekeepers; regulators;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Differential rates, residual information sets and transactional algebras," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo., Universidad del CEMA 256, Universidad del CEMA.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Corporate Rent-Seeking and the managerial soft-budget constraint," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo., Universidad del CEMA 283, Universidad del CEMA.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "How corporate governance and globalization can run afoul of the law and good practices in business: The Enron's disgraceful affair," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo., Universidad del CEMA 225, Universidad del CEMA.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2014. "Another viewpoint on investment funds. And their opaque governance," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo., Universidad del CEMA 535, Universidad del CEMA.
- Rodolfo Apreda, 2012. "Embedding Minsky´s taxonomy of cash flows into a corporate finance framework (The microeconomic linkage between speculative and Ponzi schemes)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo., Universidad del CEMA 497, Universidad del CEMA.
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