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Opaque governance, special purpose vehicles, and the preacher´s waiver

Author

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  • Rodolfo Apreda

Abstract

This paper argues that special purpose vehicles, SPVs, are two-edged financial constructs whose bad edge consists in conveying opaque governance, whereas its good one amounts to interesting financial engineering. Firstly, the notion of opaque governance is highlighted, to focus next on SPVs and their governance. Afterwards, the paper delves into collateralized debt obligations and their facilitators, the offshore locations. Last, the failing role of some regulators and gatekeepers is emphasized with the purpose of setting up new measures to prevent them from claiming the Preacher’s waiver.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodolfo Apreda, 2012. "Opaque governance, special purpose vehicles, and the preacher´s waiver," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 481, Universidad del CEMA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:481
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    File URL: https://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/481.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Differential rates, residual information sets and transactional algebras," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 256, Universidad del CEMA.
    2. Hyun Song Shin, 2009. "Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run That Heralded the Global Financial Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 101-119, Winter.
    3. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "How corporate governance and globalization can run afoul of the law and good practices in business: The Enron's disgraceful affair," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 225, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Corporate Rent-Seeking and the managerial soft-budget constraint," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 283, Universidad del CEMA.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rodolfo Apreda, 2012. "Embedding Minsky´s taxonomy of cash flows into a corporate finance framework (The microeconomic linkage between speculative and Ponzi schemes)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 497, Universidad del CEMA.
    2. Rodolfo Apreda, 2014. "Accountability and transparency as learning processes in private, public and global governance," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 546, Universidad del CEMA.
    3. Rodolfo Apreda, 2014. "Another viewpoint on investment funds. And their opaque governance," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 535, Universidad del CEMA.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    opaque governance; special purpose vehicles; collateralized debt obligations; offshore locations; gatekeepers; regulators;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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