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Impact of the financial crisis on bank run risk – Danger of the days after

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  • Goedde-Menke, Michael
  • Langer, Thomas
  • Pfingsten, Andreas

Abstract

We examine the developments of depositor knowledge, attitudes, and behavior throughout the recent financial crisis and discuss their impact on bank run risk. Based on a self-collected data set surveying depositors before (2007), at (2008), and after the peak of the crisis (2009), we observe a worrying dynamic pattern. At the peak, depositors knew more about deposit insurance, placed more importance on deposit security, and slightly raised their deposits. However, in the aftermath of the crisis the enhanced depositor knowledge proved to be non-permanent while the increased importance of deposit security and the exposure of depositors persisted. The proportion of completely uninformed, strongly involved, and highly exposed depositors, who carry the highest risk of triggering a bank run, was reduced around the peak of the crisis but rebounded strongly afterwards, even exceeding pre-crisis levels. These findings point to a higher bank run risk in the aftermath than during the financial crisis.

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  • Goedde-Menke, Michael & Langer, Thomas & Pfingsten, Andreas, 2014. "Impact of the financial crisis on bank run risk – Danger of the days after," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 522-533.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:522-533
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.11.028
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    3. Lukasz Kozlowski, 2018. "The Halo Effect in Banking: Evidence from Local Markets," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 68(5), pages 416-441, October.
    4. Fecht, Falko & Thum, Stefan & Weber, Patrick, 2019. "Fear, deposit insurance schemes, and deposit reallocation in the German banking system," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 151-165.
    5. Molterer, Manuel, 2019. "Tougher than the rest? The resilience of specialized financial intermediation to macroeconomic shocks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 163-174.
    6. Daniel Brodback & Nadja Guenster & David Mezger, 2019. "Altruism and egoism in investment decisions," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 118-148, January.
    7. Philip Molyneux & Vineet Upreti & Tim Zhou, 2022. "Depositor Market Discipline: New Evidence from Selling Failed Banks," Working Papers 2022-03, Swansea University, School of Management.
    8. Varotto, Simone & Zhao, Lei, 2018. "Systemic risk and bank size," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 45-70.
    9. Ammari, Aymen & Allodi, Evita & Salerno, Dario & Stella, Gian Paolo, 2023. "An asymmetrical approach to understanding consumer characteristics in banking trust during the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    10. Grira, Jocelyn & Hassan, M. Kabir & Soumaré, Issouf, 2016. "Pricing beliefs: Empirical evidence from the implied cost of deposit insurance for Islamic banks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 152-168.
    11. Fiordelisi, Franco & Scardozzi, Giulia, 2022. "Bank funding strategy after the bail-in announcement," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    12. Kaposty, Florian & Pfingsten, Andreas & Domikowsky, Christian, 2017. "Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Competitive Advantages: Evidence from the Financial Crisis," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168146, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial crisis; Bank run; Deposit insurance; Depositor; Knowledge;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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