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Orders to Supply as Substitutes for Commitments to Aftermarkets

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Author Info
Zhiqi Chen () (Department of Economics, Carleton University)
Tom Ross () (University of British Columbia)

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Abstract

A number of recent antitrust cases in the United States, Canada and Europe have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. Earlier work suggested that even if the market for the original product is very competitive, a market imperfection might exist if the manufacturer cannot commit ex ante to pricing repairs at marginal cost.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) with number 96-02.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jun 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:car:ciorup:96-02

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Related research
Keywords: DURABLE GOODS; atter markets; refusals to deal;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2001. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," NBER Working Papers 8086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. David A. Miller, 2005. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," Industrial Organization 0510001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Paul Isely & Matthew R. Roelofs, 2004. "Primary market and aftermarket competition in the bicycle component industry," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 36(18), pages 2097-2102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Zhiqi Chen & Thomas Ross & W. Stanbury, 1998. "Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 131-151, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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