Orders to Supply as Substitutes for Commitments to Aftermarkets
AbstractA number of recent antitrust cases in the United States, Canada and Europe have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. Earlier work suggested that even if the market for the original product is very competitive, a market imperfection might exist if the manufacturer cannot commit ex ante to pricing repairs at marginal cost.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) with number 96-02.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jun 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Zhiqi Chen & Thomas W. Ross, 1998. "Orders to Supply as Substitutes for Commitments to Aftermarkets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1204-1224, November.
- L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
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- Keisuke Hattori & Amihai Glazer, 2013. "How to Commit to a Future Price," Working Papers 131402, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Paul Isely & Matthew Roelofs, 2004. "Primary market and aftermarket competition in the bicycle component industry," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(18), pages 2097-2102.
- Zhiqi Chen & Tom Ross, .
"Refusals to Deal and Orders to Supply in Competitive Markets,"
Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU)
94-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 1999. "Refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 399-417, April.
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"Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 230-55, February.
- Morita, Hodaka & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs," MPRA Paper 1426, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michael Waldman, 2010.
"Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets,"
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Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 54-91, April.
- Zhiqi Chen & Thomas Ross & W. Stanbury, 1998. "Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 131-151, April.
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