Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983
We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.
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Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number
00-11.
Length: 41 pages Date of creation: 01 Mar 2000 Date of revision: Publication status: Published: Public Choice 109: 1, 69-99 Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:00-11
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
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