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Why Tax Energy? Towards a More Rational Energy Policy

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  • Newbery, D.

Abstract

The same fuels are taxed at widely different rates in different countries while different fuels are taxed at widely different rates within and across countries. Coal, oil and gas are all used to generate electricity, but are subject to very different tax or subsidy regimes. This paper considers what tax theory has to say about efficient energy tax design. The main factors for energy taxes are the optimal tariff argument, the need to correct externalities such as global warming, and second-best considerations for taxing transport fuels as road charges, but these are inadequate to explain current energy taxes. EU energy tax harmonisation and Kyoto suggest that the time is ripe to reform energy taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Newbery, D., 2005. "Why Tax Energy? Towards a More Rational Energy Policy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0508, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0508
    Note: CMI, IO
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep72.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Deaton, Angus & Stern, Nicholas, 1986. "Optimally uniform commodity taxes, taste differences and lump-sum grants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 263-266.
    2. W. J. Corlett & D. C. Hague, 1953. "Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 21(1), pages 21-30.
    3. Unknown, 1986. "Letters," Choices: The Magazine of Food, Farm, and Resource Issues, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 1(4), pages 1-9.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax; energy; oil; optimal tariff; externalities; exhaustible resources; global warming; road charges;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

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