IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bol/bodewp/wp884.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cooperative firms and the crisis: evidence from some Italian mixed oligopolies

Author

Listed:
  • F. Delbono
  • C. Reggiani

Abstract

We investigate how cooperative firms reacted to the current crisis. This allows us to compare the behavior of cooperative and conventional firms facing exogenous shifts in demand. After a short survey of a stream of theoretical literature, we analyze a large group of Italian production cooperatives in the periods 2003-2010 and 1994-2011 and we contrast co-ops behavior with the overall trend in the industries in which they operate. Our sample s evidence suggests that the cooperative s behavior has a stabilizing effect on employment with respect to shocks in output demand. Unlike profit-maximizers, cooperative firms seem to be adjusting pay more than employment when facing shocks. Production co-ops look better equipped than their profit-maximizing counterparts in tackling the long recession also because they have been very cautious in their profit policies over time. Unlike conventional firms, they have significantly increased their own equity during good years instead of distributing large dividends to their members.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Delbono & C. Reggiani, 2013. "Cooperative firms and the crisis: evidence from some Italian mixed oligopolies," Working Papers wp884, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp884
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/3691/1/WP884.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Burdín, Gabriel & Dean, Andrés, 2012. "Revisiting the objectives of worker-managed firms: An empirical assessment," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 158-171.
    2. Gal-Or, Esther & Landsberger, Michael & Subotnik, Abraham, 1980. "Allocative and distributional effects of a monopolistic cooperative firm in a capitalist economy," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 158-172, June.
    3. Mai, Chao-Cheng & Hwang, Hong, 1989. "Export subsidies and oligopolistic rivalry between labor-managed and capitalist economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 473-480, September.
    4. Hill, Martyn & Waterson, Michael, 1983. "Labor-managed Cournot oligopoly and industry output," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 43-51, March.
    5. Delbono, Flavio & Rossini, Gianpaolo, 1992. "Competition policy vs horizontal merger with public, entrepreneurial, and labor-managed firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 226-240, June.
    6. Ben Craig & John Pencavel, 1995. "Participation and Productiviy: A Comparison of Worker Cooperatives and Conventional Firms in the Plywood Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(1995 Micr), pages 121-174.
    7. Horowitz, Ira, 1991. "On the effects of cournot rivalry between entrepreneurial and cooperative firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 115-121, March.
    8. Craig Ben & Pencavel John, 1993. "The Objectives of Worker Cooperatives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 288-308, June.
    9. Craig, Ben & Pencavel, John, 1992. "The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1083-1105, December.
    10. John Pencavel & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2006. "Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and Worker-Owned Firms," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(1), pages 23-44, October.
    11. Cremer, Helmuth & Cremer, Jacques, 1992. "Duopoly with employee-controlled and profit-maximizing firms: Bertrand vs Cournot competition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 241-258, June.
    12. Burdín, Gabriel & Dean, Andrés, 2009. "New evidence on wages and employment in worker cooperatives compared with capitalist firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 517-533, December.
    13. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. "Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Delbono, Flavio & Lanzi, Diego & Reggiani, Carlo, 2023. "Workers’ firm in mixed duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Flavio Delbono, 2016. "Le cooperative di produzione e la stabilit? occupazionale," QUADERNI DI ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(105), pages 166-177.
    3. Guido Caselli & Michele Costa & Flavio Delbono, 2022. "What do cooperative firms maximize, if at all? Evidence from Emilia‐Romagna in the pre‐Covid decade," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(4), pages 821-847, December.
    4. Virginie Pérotin, 2013. "Worker Cooperatives: Good, Sustainable Jobs in the Community," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 2(2), pages 34-47, May.
    5. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    6. Carlo Borzaga & Chiara Carini & Ermanno Celeste Tortia, 2022. "Co‐operative enterprise anti‐cyclicality and the economic crisis: A comparative analysis of employment dynamics in Italy," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(3), pages 551-577, September.
    7. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, January.
    8. Dean, Andrés, 2019. "Do successful worker-managed firms degenerate?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 317-329.
    9. Flavio Delbono & Diego Lanzi & Carlo Reggiani, 2022. "Beyond Illyria: Workers' Firm in Mixed Oligopoly," Working Papers wp1170, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    10. Bennett, John & Estrin, Saul & Hare, Paul, 1999. "Output and Exports in Transition Economies: A Labor Management Model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 295-317, June.
    11. Jose Garcia‐Louzao, 2021. "Employment and Wages over the Business Cycle in Worker‐Owned Firms: Evidence from Spain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 59(2), pages 418-443, June.
    12. Burdín, Gabriel & Dean, Andrés, 2012. "Revisiting the objectives of worker-managed firms: An empirical assessment," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 158-171.
    13. Marina Albanese, 2020. "Social and Relational Variables in Worker Cooperatives: Implications for the Objective Function," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 9(1), pages 26-44.
    14. Tortia, Ermanno C., 2021. "Employment protection regimes and dismissal of members in worker cooperatives," MPRA Paper 109214, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Guillermo Alves & Gabriel Burdin & Paula Carrasco & Andrés Dean & Andrés Rius, 2012. "Empleo, remuneraciones e inversión en cooperativas de trabajadores y empresas convencionales: nueva evidencia para Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-14, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    16. Gabriel Burdín, 2014. "Are Worker-Managed Firms More Likely to Fail Than Conventional Enterprises? Evidence from Uruguay," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 67(1), pages 202-238, January.
    17. Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2019. "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: wage setting in worker owned enterprises," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 653-671, October.
    18. Donald A R George & Eddi Fontanari & Ermanno Tortia, 2019. "Finance, property rights and productivity in Italian cooperatives," DEM Working Papers 2019/20, Department of Economics and Management.
    19. Tortia, Ermanno Celeste, 2019. "Employment protection regimes in worker co-operatives: dismissal of worker members and distributive fairness," MPRA Paper 94536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2022. "Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(1), pages 27-42, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp884. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sebolit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.