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Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and Worker-Owned Firms

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  • John Pencavel
  • Luigi Pistaferri
  • Fabiano Schivardi

Abstract

The authors investigate how worker-owned and capitalist enterprises differ with respect to wages, employment, and capital in Italy, the market economy with the greatest incidence of worker-owned and worker-managed firms. Estimates calculated using a matched employer-worker panel data set for the years 1982–94 largely corroborate the implications of orthodox behavioral models of the two types of enterprise. Co-ops had 14% lower wages than capitalist enterprises, on average; more volatile wages; and less volatile employment. Given the quality of the data set analyzed, the authors argue, these results can be regarded as having broad generality.

Suggested Citation

  • John Pencavel & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2006. "Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist and Worker-Owned Firms," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(1), pages 23-44, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:60:y:2006:i:1:p:23-44
    DOI: 10.1177/001979390606000102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pencavel, John & Craig, Ben, 1994. "The Empirical Performance of Orthodox Models of the Firm: Conventional Firms and Worker Cooperatives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 718-744, August.
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    3. Federico Cingano & Fabiano Schivardi, 2004. "Identifying the Sources of Local Productivity Growth," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(4), pages 720-742, June.
    4. Jones, D.C. & Svejnar, J., 1984. "Participation, profit sharing, worker ownership and efficieny in Italian producer cooperatives," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1984019, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Jones, Derek C & Svejnar, Jan, 1985. "Participation, Profit Sharing, Worker Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Cooperative," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 52(208), pages 449-465, November.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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