Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation
AbstractWe set up a model to study how ownership structure, corporate law and employment law interact to set the incentives that influence the decision by the large shareholder or manager effectively controlling the firm to divert resources from minority shareholders and employees. We suggest that agency problems between the controller and other investors and holdup problems between shareholders and employees are connected if the controller bears private costs of “expropriating” these groups. Corporate law and employment law may therefore somethimes be substitutes; employees may benefit from better corporate law intended to protect minority shareholder, and viceversa. Our model has implications for the domestic and comparative study of corporate governance structure and addresses, among other things, the question whether large shareholders are better able to “bond” with employees than dispersed ones, or whether the separation of ownership facilitates longterm relationships with labor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp735.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Ecchia Giulio & Gelter Martin & Pasotti Piero, 2012. "Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 457-486, October.
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-03-19 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2011-03-19 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-LAB-2011-03-19 (Labour Economics)
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[Corporate Governance Conflicts and Employment and," MPRA Paper 40215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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