Hiring incentives and labour force participation in Italy
AbstractA long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-end contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-end contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002. This increase was concentrated on males aged 35-54, with a low or at most a secondary schooling level, and might be due to the choice to leave undegraound economy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 552.
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
labour supply; program evaluation; temporary contracts; open-end contracts; shadow economy;
Other versions of this item:
- Piero Cipollone & Corrado Di Maria & Anita Guelfi, 2004. "Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 63(2), pages 161-203, November.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2005-07-25 (European Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-07-25 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- cipollone piero & Anita Guelfi, 2003. "tax credit policy and firms' behaviour: the case of subsidy to open-end labour contract in italy," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 471, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
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