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Seniority-based pay: Is it used as a motivation device?

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Author Info
Alberto Bayo-Moriones () (Departamento de Gestión de Empresas, Universidad Pública de Navarra)
Abstract

The purpose of this article is to explain what factors determine the use of seniority-based pay for production workers in Spanish manufacturing industry. The data used in order to achieve these objectives was taken from 774 Spanish industrial plants. The estimation of several ordered probit models enabled us to see that in firms where it was more costly for management to engage in opportunistic behaviour, deferred payment shows a negative relation to the use of devices, like monitoring or incentive payment, designed to align workers’ objectives with those of the company.

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File URL: http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/documents/01-3.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2001
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona in its series Working Papers with number 200103.

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Date of creation: May 2001
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Handle: RePEc:bbe:wpaper:200103

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Related research
Keywords: seniority-based pay delayed payment manual workers Spanish manufacturing firm

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executive Compensation

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  1. Hutchens, Robert M, 1987. "A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages S153-70, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Loewenstein, George F & Sicherman, Nachum, 1991. "Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 67-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1989. "Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 65-83, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Altonji, Joseph G & Shakotko, Robert A, 1987. "Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 437-59, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Hashimoto, Masanori & Raisian, John, 1985. "Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 721-35, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Medoff, James L & Abraham, Katharine G, 1980. "Experience, Performance, and Earnings," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 703-36, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Katharine G. Abraham & Henry S. Farber, 1987. "Job Duration, Seniority, and Earnings," NBER Working Papers 1819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Barth, Erling, 1997. "Firm-Specific Seniority and Wages," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages 495-506, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Salop, Joanne & Salop, Steven, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-27, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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