The long road to EMU: The Economic and Political Reasoning behind Maastricht
AbstractThis paper aims to examine whether the economic and political reasoning behind Maastricht is consistent with earlier approaches to monetary integration. In doing so, it revisits the intellectual debate on monetary integration in Europe at different stages. It concludes that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as agreed at Maastricht reflected a compromise between two different but converging preferences, in the context of the experience of the European Monetary System (EMS) and other developments in national and European politics as well as in economic thought, on the role of monetary policy and institutions; the fall of the Berlin Wall may have added a new political dimension that might have made it easier to agree on the blueprint and on the calendar for the realisation of EMU. The various (political and economic) motivations for the convergence of initially different views on the role of monetary policy and successive interpretations of the objectives of EMU are discussed within the wider context of the process of European integration.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro in its series Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) with number 50.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Economic and Monetary Union; Bretton Woods; European integration; Werner plan; European Monetary System; inflation; convergence of preferences; epistemic communities; currency crisis; monetary sovereignty; Maastricht treaty; convergence requirements.;
Other versions of this item:
- Francisco Torres, 2007. "The long road to EMU: The Economic and Political Reasoning behind Maastricht," NIPE Working Papers 23/2007, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-11-17 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2007-11-17 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2007-11-17 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Torres,Francisco & Giavazzi,Francesco (ed.), 1993. "Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521440196, December.
- Charles Wyplosz, 2006. "European Monetary Union: the dark sides of a major success," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 21(46), pages 207-261, 04.
- Paul Grauwe, 1996. "The economics of convergence: Towards monetary union in Europe," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 1-27, March.
- Eichengreen, Barry & Ghironi, Fabio, 1995. "European Monetary Unification: The Challenges Ahead," CEPR Discussion Papers 1217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Stefan Collignon, 2005. "Learning to live in Euroland - The role of France and Germany," Macroeconomics 0503012, EconWPA.
- Ivo Maes, 2006. "THE ASCENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AS AN ACTOR IN THE MONETARY INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE 1960s," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(2), pages 222-241, 05.
- Haas, Peter M., 1992. "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(01), pages 1-35, December.
- Francisco Torres, 2007. "A convergência para a União Económica e Monetária: objectivo nacional ou constrangimento externo?," NIPE Working Papers 21/2007, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marta Ferreira Dias).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.