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Impact of resource availability and conformity effect on sustainability of common-pool resources

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  • Chengyi Tu
  • Renfei Chen
  • Ying Fan
  • Xuwei Pan

Abstract

Sustainability of common-pool resources hinges on the interplay between human and environmental systems. However, there is still a lack of a novel and comprehensive framework for modelling extraction of common-pool resources and cooperation of human agents that can account for different factors that shape the system behavior and outcomes. In particular, we still lack a critical value for ensuring resource sustainability under different scenarios. In this paper, we present a novel framework for studying resource extraction and cooperation in human-environmental systems for common-pool resources. We explore how different factors, such as resource availability and conformity effect, influence the players' decisions and the resource outcomes. We identify critical values for ensuring resource sustainability under various scenarios. We demonstrate the observed phenomena are robust to the complexity and assumptions of the models and discuss implications of our study for policy and practice, as well as the limitations and directions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Chengyi Tu & Renfei Chen & Ying Fan & Xuwei Pan, 2023. "Impact of resource availability and conformity effect on sustainability of common-pool resources," Papers 2310.07577, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2310.07577
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    2. Andrew R. Tilman, 2023. "Cooperate to save a changing planet," Nature Sustainability, Nature, vol. 6(2), pages 120-121, February.
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