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2020 annual report of the European Fiscal Board

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  • European Fiscal Board (EFB)

Abstract

The report assesses the implementation of the EU fiscal framework in 2019 and highlights several points of stress calling for future improvement. The year 2019 marked the first time in almost two decades without any EU Member State under the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). Yet, the aggregate government deficit in the EU slightly increased for the first time since 2011, on the back of recurring slippages in current expenditure. However, many governments had failed to build buffers in good times, a serial failure that impinged on some countries’ ability to absorb the economic impact of the pandemic this year. The economic and social devastation left by the Covid-19 pandemic fully justified the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), allowing governments to respond to the crisis as they saw fit. However, as indicated in its report published in June, the EFB is of the view that the conditions under which to de-activate the clause should be reviewed soon. The Covid-19 crisis has stressed three long-standing gaps in EMU’s architecture: - a genuine and permanent central fiscal capacity; - a lack of incentives to maintain or scale up growth-enhancing government expenditure; - a reformed and leaner Stability and Growth Pact with a country-specific debt reduction rule . The Next Generation EU and the SURE partly address the first two gaps, albeit on a temporary basis. As many Member States will come out of this crisis with historically high debt levels (often well above 100% of GDP), it is urgent to preserve a credible medium-term anchor for fiscal policies and, thus, to revive and preferably conclude the SGP reform process before the de-activation of the general escape clause. The EFB has already proposed to streamline and strengthen the framework by focussing on country-specific debt anchors achieved through an expenditure rule as single operational target.

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  • European Fiscal Board (EFB), 2020. "2020 annual report of the European Fiscal Board," Annual reports 2020, European Fiscal Board.
  • Handle: RePEc:aon:annual:2020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Mathieu & Henri Sterdyniak, 2021. "Vers une réforme des règles budgétaires dans la zone euro ?," Working Papers hal-03474871, HAL.
    2. Benalal, Nicholai & Freier, Maximilian & Melyn, Wim & Van Parys, Stefan & Reiss, Lukas, 2022. "Towards a single fiscal performance indicator," Occasional Paper Series 288, European Central Bank.
    3. Jakub Szczepkowski, 2022. "Marketing relacji w pracy brokera innowacji (Relationship Marketing in the Work of an Innovation Broker)," Research Reports, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(37), pages 48-56.
    4. Mancini, Anna Laura & Tommasino, Pietro, 2023. "Fiscal rules and the reliability of public investment plans: Evidence from local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Heinemann Friedrich & Kemper Jan, 2021. "The ECB Under the Threat of Fiscal Dominance – The Individual Central Banker Dimension," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 5-30, December.
    6. Debrun, Xavier & Masuch, Klaus & Ferrero, Guiseppe & Vansteenkiste, Isabel & Ferdinandusse, Marien & von Thadden, Leopold & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Alloza, Mario & Derouen, Chloé & Bańkowski, Krzyszto, 2021. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 273, European Central Bank.
    7. Christian Breuer, 2020. "Goverment Debt Post COVID-19: Back To Golden Rules," Chemnitz Economic Papers 041, Department of Economics, Chemnitz University of Technology, revised Feb 2020.
    8. Friedrich Heinemann, 2021. "The political economy of euro area sovereign debt restructuring," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 502-522, December.
    9. Puonti, Päivi, 2022. "Public Debt and Economic Growth," ETLA Reports 127, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.

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