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Versagen und Reformbedarf der deutschen Finanzaufsicht

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Hellwig

    (Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsguetern)

  • Gerhard Schick

    (Buergerbewegung Finanzwende)

Abstract

Die deutsche Finanzaufsicht wurde nach der Finanzkrise 2008 keiner umfassenden Reform unterzogen, obwohl ihre Fehler im Vorfeld der Finanzkrise offenkundig waren und die Bankenrettungen den Steuerzahler ueber 80 Milliarden Euro kosteten. Auch spaetere Skandale haben keine wesentlichen Reformen veranlasst. Auch die Reaktion auf den Wirecard-Skandal war nicht ausreichend. Wir skizzieren Fehlentwicklungen und Aufsichtsversagen dieser zwei Jahrzehnte und fuehren diese auf die politischen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen sowie das Selbstverstaendnis und die Arbeitsweise der Aufsicht zurueck. Rahmenbedingungen, Arbeitsweise und Selbstverstaendnis muessen grundlegend reformiert werden. Dazu legen wir verschiedene Vorschlaege vor, fuer groessere Unabhaengigkeit und Transparenz, fuer bessere Durchsetzungsmoeglichkeiten und fuer mehr Professionalitaet.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Hellwig & Gerhard Schick, 2022. "Versagen und Reformbedarf der deutschen Finanzaufsicht," Working Papers 2, Forum New Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:agz:wpaper:2202
    as

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    File URL: https://newforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/FNE-WP02-2022.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 129-207, June.
    2. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929.
    3. Kaufhold, Ann-Katrin & Langenbucher, Katja & Blank, Patrick & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2021. "BaFin (in)dependence - a reform proposal," SAFE White Paper Series 82, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    4. Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013. "Securitization without risk transfer," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
    5. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(02), pages 40-46, July.
    6. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:2:p:14566986 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : Wirecard; Cum-Ex; financial supervision; BaFin; new financial supervision paradigm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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