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Some New Ordering in Economics of Information

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  • Sulganik, Eyal

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  • Sulganik, Eyal, 1990. "Some New Ordering in Economics of Information," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275493, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275493
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275493
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    2. Gould, John P., 1974. "Risk, stochastic preference, and the value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 64-84, May.
    3. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
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