IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/eaae99/7724.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Managing Perceived Risks through Supply Chain Relationships: An Empirical Study of the UK Beef Sector

Author

Listed:
  • Hornibrook, Susan A.
  • Fearne, Andrew

Abstract

This study offers an alternative to the traditional Transaction Cost Economics view of the treatment of information by viewing co-ordinated supply chains as a series of Principal-Agent relationships, and draws on Perceived Risk Theory to explain both consumer and organisational behaviour. Using a supply chain methodology, empirical evidence is presented of the perceived risks, associated management strategies and benefits for all members, including consumers/customers, for two co-ordinated supply chains for own brand fresh beef products in the UK, one in the retail sector and one in the foodservice sector. The results conclude that the establishment of the two co-ordinated supply chains reduces perceived risk for consumers and each participating organisation by increasing information on members' goals and behaviour, recognising perceived risk at each point and offering both positive and negative incentives to meet contractual requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Hornibrook, Susan A. & Fearne, Andrew, 2006. "Managing Perceived Risks through Supply Chain Relationships: An Empirical Study of the UK Beef Sector," 99th Seminar, February 8-10, 2006, Bonn, Germany 7724, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae99:7724
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7724
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7724/files/sp06ho01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.7724?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Diamond, William D, 1988. "The Effect of Probability and Consequence Levels on the Focus of Consumer Judgments in Risky Situations," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 15(2), pages 280-283, September.
    2. Steven Tadelis & Oliver E.Williamson, 2012. "Transaction Cost Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Dowling, Grahame R & Staelin, Richard, 1994. "A Model of Perceived Risk and Intended Risk-Handling Activity," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 21(1), pages 119-134, June.
    5. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    6. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    7. Jill E. Hobbs, 1997. "Measuring the Importance of Transaction Costs in Cattle Marketing," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1083-1095.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Olivier Meier & Aurélie Sannajust, 0. "The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
    2. Wu, Zhenyu & Chua, Jess H. & Chrisman, James J., 2007. "Effects of family ownership and management on small business equity financing," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 875-895, November.
    3. An, Suwei, 2023. "Essays on incentive contracts, M&As, and firm risk," Other publications TiSEM dd97d2f5-1c9d-47c5-ba62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. James J. Chrisman & Kristen Madison & Taewoo Kim, 2021. "A Dynamic Framework of Noneconomic Goals and Inter-Family Agency Complexities in Multi-Family Firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 45(4), pages 906-930, July.
    5. Julia Heidemann & Marcus Kaiser & Mathias Klier & Florian Probst, 2012. "Customer lifetime value-based sales force control in the financial services industry— an incentive-compatible remuneration model," Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 27-51, September.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    7. Claudinê Jordão de Carvalho, 2015. "Conditioning Factors of Late Payment of Trade Credit," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 0(2), pages 72-91, August.
    8. Fasshauer, Stephan, 2001. "Das Principal-Agent-Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik als zentrales Problem der Alterssicherung in Deutschland," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 31, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    9. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1989. "Symposium on Microeconomics: 1 Reflections on the State of Economics: 1988," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(1), pages 66-72, March.
    10. Jess H. Chua & James J. Chrisman & Erich B. Bergiel, 2009. "An Agency Theoretic Analysis of the Professionalized Family Firm," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 33(2), pages 355-372, March.
    11. Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, 2005. "Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 161-206, January.
    12. Bernard Paulré, 2001. "Enjeux et dilemmes de l'économie cognitive," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00135486, HAL.
    13. Schmidt, Reinhard H., 2020. "Das Arbeitsgebiet "Unternehmensfinanzierung" als Teil der deutschen Betriebswirtschaftslehre," IBF Paper Series 02-20, IBF – Institut für Bank- und Finanzgeschichte / Institute for Banking and Financial History, Frankfurt am Main.
    14. Curtiss, Jarmila, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Capital Use: Review of theories and implications for rural businesses," Working papers 122846, Factor Markets, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    15. Enzo Scannella & Salvatore Polizzi, 2021. "How to measure bank credit risk disclosure? Testing a new methodological approach based on the content analysis framework," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(1), pages 73-95, March.
    16. Franziska Rischkowsky & Thomas Döring, 2008. "Consumer Policy in a Market Economy Considerations from the Perspective of the Economics of Information, the New Institutional Economics as well as Behavioural Economics," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 285-313, September.
    17. Bernard Paulré, 2001. "Enjeux et dilemmes de l'économie cognitive," Working Papers halshs-00135486, HAL.
    18. Olivier Meier & Aurélie Sannajust, 2021. "The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 1073-1088, August.
    19. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    20. Isaline Thirion & Patrick Reichert & Virginie Xhauflair & Jonathan Jonck, 2022. "From Fiduciary Duty to Impact Fidelity: Managerial Compensation in Impact Investing," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 179(4), pages 991-1010, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:eaae99:7724. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eaaeeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.