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Das Principal-Agent-Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik als zentrales Problem der Alterssicherung in Deutschland

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  • Fasshauer, Stephan
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    Abstract

    Die Ausführungen behandeln die institutionelle Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung in Deutschland. Im Mittelpunkt steht das Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik. Die Beziehung wird im Rahmen der Principal-Agent-Theorie – mit der Bevölkerung als Principal und der Politik als Agent – ausführlich beleuchtet. In einem ersten Schritt wird hierbei ein kurzer Überblick über die Principal-Agent-Theorie gegeben und das bestehende Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik in diesen theoretischen Ansatz eingeordnet. Anschließend wird die Beziehung modelltheoretisch bei Sicherheit / Unsicherheit bzw. symmetrischer Informationsverteilung / asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung analysiert. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt sich, dass die bestehende „Vertragsbeziehung“ zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik im Bereich der Alterssicherung im Vergleich mit alternativen Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten führt. Abgeschlossen werden die Ausführungen mit wirtschaftspolitischen Implikationen und Ansätzen für konkrete wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics in its series W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers with number 31.

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    Date of creation: 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:wuewep:31

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    Related research

    Keywords: Principal-Agent-Theorie; Alterssicherung; Wohlfahrtseffekte;

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    1. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Stefan Voigt & Gert G. Wagner, 2000. "Zur Logik der Rentenanpassung: ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 195, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 353, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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