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Restricting Risk-taking by Financial Intermediaries through Executive Compensation

In: Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance

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  • Tom Berglund

Abstract

The contributors – top international scholars from finance, law and business – explore the role of governance, both internal and external, in explaining risk-taking and other aspects of the behavior of financial institutions. Additionally, they discuss market and policy features affecting objectives and quality of governance. The chapters provide in-depth analysis of factors such as: ownership, efficiency and stability; market discipline; compensation and performance; social responsibility; and governance in non-bank financial institutions. Only through this kind of rigorous examination can one hope to implement the financial reforms necessary and sufficient to reduce the likelihood and severity of future crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Tom Berglund, 2012. "Restricting Risk-taking by Financial Intermediaries through Executive Compensation," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14045_11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M., 2011. "Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 11-26, January.
    2. Marc CHESNEY & Jacob STROMBERG & Alexander F. WAGNER, 2010. "Risk-taking Incentives, Governance,and Losses in the Financial Crisis," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 10-18, Swiss Finance Institute, revised Jul 2010.
    3. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
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