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The Value of Health Insurance

In: The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition

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  • John A. Nyman

Abstract

This comprehensive collection brings together more than 50 contributions from some of the most influential researchers in health economics. It authoritatively covers theoretical and empirical issues in health economics, with a balanced range of material on equity and efficiency in health care systems, health technology assessment and issues of concern for developing countries. This thoroughly revised second edition is expanded to include four new chapters, while all existing chapters have been extensively updated.

Suggested Citation

  • John A. Nyman, 2012. "The Value of Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14021_9
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849802673.00019.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
    2. Nyman, J.A., 1999. "The Welfare Economics of Insurance Contracts that pay off by Reducing Price," Papers 308, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
    3. de Meza, David, 1983. "Health insurance and the demand for medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 47-54, March.
    4. Andrew M. Jones (ed.), 2012. "The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14021.
    5. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-280, Part I, M.
    6. Pauly, Mark, 1983. "More on moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 81-85, March.
    7. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
    8. Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, 1948. "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 279-279.
    9. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
    10. Feldstein, Martin & Friedman, Bernard, 1977. "Tax subsidies, the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 155-178, April.
    11. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The value of health insurance: the access motive," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-152, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Smith, 2019. "Can a Strong Economic Case Be Made for Investing in the NHS?," Monograph 002090, Office of Health Economics.

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