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Health insurance theory: the case of the missing welfare gain

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  • John Nyman

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  • John Nyman, 2008. "Health insurance theory: the case of the missing welfare gain," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 9(4), pages 369-380, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:9:y:2008:i:4:p:369-380
    DOI: 10.1007/s10198-007-0084-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    2. Pauly, Mark, 1983. "More on moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 81-85, March.
    3. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The value of health insurance: the access motive," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-152, April.
    4. William J. Baumol & Charles A. Wilson (ed.), 2001. "Welfare Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 529.
    5. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-280, Part I, M.
    6. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
    7. Crew, Michael A, 1969. "Coinsurance and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(5), pages 906-908, December.
    8. Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, 1948. "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 279-279.
    9. Feldman, Roger & Dowd, Bryan, 1991. "A New Estimate of the Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 297-301, March.
    10. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhou, Wenhui & Wan, Qiang & Zhang, Ren-Qian, 2017. "Choosing among hospitals in the subsidized health insurance system of China: A sequential game approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(2), pages 568-585.
    2. Christel E. van Dijk & Bernard van den Berg & Robert A. Verheij & Peter Spreeuwenberg & Peter P. Groenewegen & Dinny H. de Bakker, 2013. "Moral Hazard And Supplier‐Induced Demand: Empirical Evidence In General Practice," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 340-352, March.
    3. Holst, Jens, 2010. "Patient cost sharing: Reforms without evidence. Theoretical considerations and empirical findings from industrialized countries," Discussion Papers, Research Group Public Health SP I 2010-303, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Batifoulier, Philippe, 2015. "Aux origines de la privatisation du financement du soin : quand la théorie de l’aléa moral rencontre le capitalisme sanitaire," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
    5. Alice Chen & Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Michael R. Richards, 2018. "Supply‐side effects from public insurance expansions: Evidence from physician labor markets," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(4), pages 690-708, April.
    6. Raphaël Cottin, 2018. "Free health care for the poor: a good way to achieve universal health coverage? Evidence from Morocco," Working Papers DT/2018/16, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).

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