The Welfare Economics of Insurance Contracts that pay off by Reducing Price
AbstractThe paper suggests that a portion of moral hazard is due to income transfers and that this portion of moral hazard should be excluded from the welfare loss Calculations. Only the portion of moral hazard that is due to the pure price effect has conventional welfare loss implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 308.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA 35455 U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
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- Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
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