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Marcelo Ariel Fernandez

Personal Details

First Name:Marcelo Ariel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Fernandez
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfe587
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://marcelo-fernandez.com

Affiliation

Economics Department
College of Business
University of Nevada-Reno

Reno, Nevada (United States)
https://www.unr.edu/business/departments-and-disciplines/economics
RePEc:edi:edunrus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín G. Bonifacio & Marcelo A. Fernandez, 2022. "Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules," Working Papers 166, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  2. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Papers 2107.04098, arXiv.org.
  3. Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel, 2018. "Deferred acceptance and regret-free truth-telling," Economics Working Paper Archive 65832, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2020.
  4. Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel & Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2017. "Imposing Commitment to Rein in Overconfidence in Learning [Implications of Overconfidence on Information Investment]," Economics Working Paper Archive 66890, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised 15 Mar 2022.

Articles

  1. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín G. Bonifacio & Marcelo A. Fernandez, 2022. "Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules," Working Papers 166, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).

    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín Bonifacio, 2022. "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4536, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.

  2. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Papers 2107.04098, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Pietro Ortoleva & Evgenii Safonov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities," NBER Working Papers 29208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kirill Rudov, 2024. "Fragile Stable Matchings," Papers 2403.12183, arXiv.org.
    3. Meisner, Vincent, 2021. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 289, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Vincent Meisner, 2023. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2733-2745, May.
    5. Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021. "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers 2106.12977, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    6. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    7. Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "An Assignment Problem with Interdependent Valuations and Externalities," Papers 2305.01477, arXiv.org.

  3. Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel, 2018. "Deferred acceptance and regret-free truth-telling," Economics Working Paper Archive 65832, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2020.

    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Papers 2207.14666, arXiv.org.
    2. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Papers 2107.04098, arXiv.org.
    3. Agustín G. Bonifacio & R. Pablo Arribillaga & Marcelo Fernández, 2022. "Regret-free truth-telling voting rules," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4543, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    4. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488, June.
    5. Vincent Meisner & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2021. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," CESifo Working Paper Series 9479, CESifo.
    6. R. Pablo Arribillaga & E. Pepa Risma, 2023. "Obvious Manipulations in Matching with and without Contracts," Papers 2306.17773, arXiv.org.
    7. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2019. "Empirical strategy-proofness," Papers 1907.12408, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
    8. Chen, Yiqiu & Möller, Markus, 0. "Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    9. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    10. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. Peter Chen & Michael Egesdal & Marek Pycia & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2021. "Quantile Stable Mechanisms," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-9, May.

Articles

  1. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (5) 2021-05-10 2021-07-26 2021-08-23 2022-09-12 2022-10-03. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2021-07-26 2021-08-23 2022-09-12. Author is listed
  3. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-08-23
  4. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2022-09-12

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