To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of United States Constitution
AbstractThis is a quantitative reexamination of the behavior of the Founding Fathers during the creation of the United States' Constitution. It employs cliometric analysis, formal economic analysis, and modern statistical techniques, to explain the choices the founders made during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. These include: What form of government did the founders intend for the Constitution? What factors motivated them to adopt particular clauses in the Constitution? What factors led them to ratify the Constitution? The author argues that the findings challenge the prevailing interpretation of the formation of the Constitution.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Oxford University Press in its series OUP Catalogue with number 9780195139709 and published in 2003.
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