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Economic Development and the Death of the Free Market

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  • Fix, Blair

Abstract

According to neoclassical economics, the most efficient way to organize human activity is to use the free market. By stoking self interest, the theory claims, individuals can benefit society. This idea, however, conflicts with the evolutionary theory of multilevel selection, which proposes that rather than stoke individual self interest, successful groups must suppress it. Which theory better describes how human societies develop? I seek to answer this question by studying the opposite of the market: namely hierarchy. I find evidence that as human societies develop, they turn increasingly to hierarchical organization. Yet they do so, paradoxically, at the same time that the language of free markets becomes more common, and culture becomes more individualistic. This evidence, I argue, contradicts free-market theory, but only if we treat it as a scientific doctrine. If instead we treat free-market theory as an ideology, the pieces come together. Free-market thinking, I speculate, may stoke the formation of hierarchy by cloaking power in the language of ‘freedom’.

Suggested Citation

  • Fix, Blair, 2021. "Economic Development and the Death of the Free Market," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Latest Ar, pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:242969
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas J. Dohmen & Ben Kriechel & Gerard A. Pfann, 2004. "Monkey bars and ladders: The importance of lateral and vertical job mobility in internal labor market careers," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 17(2), pages 193-228, June.
    2. Eriksson, Tor, 1999. "Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 262-280, April.
    3. Bichler, Shimshon & Nitzan, Jonathan, 2020. "Growing through Sabotage: Energizing Hierarchical Power," Review of Capital as Power, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism, vol. 1(5), pages 1-78.
    4. Ariga, Kenn & Brunello, Giorgio & Ohkusa, Yasushi & Nishiyama, Yoshihiko, 1992. "Corporate hierarchy, promotion, and firm growth: Japanese internal labor market in transition," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 440-471, December.
    5. Backhouse,Roger E., 2010. "The Puzzle of Modern Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521532617.
    6. Baker, George & Gibbs, Michael & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1993. "Hierarchies and compensation: A case study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 366-378, April.
    7. Fichtner, Jan & Heemskerk, Eelke M. & Garcia-Bernardo, Javier, 2017. "Hidden power of the Big Three? Passive index funds, re-concentration of corporate ownership, and new financial riskâ€," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 298-326, June.
    8. Rick Audas & Tim Barmby & John Treble, 2004. "Luck, Effort, and Reward in an Organizational Hierarchy," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 379-396, April.
    9. Christian Arnsperger & Yanis Varoufakis, 2006. "What Is Neoclassical Economics? The three axioms responsible for its theoretical oeuvre, practical irrelevance and, thus, discursive power," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 53(1), pages 5-18, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fix, Blair, 2021. "Redistributing Income Through Hierarchy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue 98, pages 58-86.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    culture; development; energy; evolution; free market; hierarchy; multilevel selection; power; sociality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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