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Guerilla Marketing: Unorthodoxes Marketing von David im Kampf gegen Goliath

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  • Nufer, Gerd

Abstract

Beim Guerilla Marketing handelt es sich um die Auswahl untypischer und undogmatischer Marketingaktivitäten, die mit einem oftmals vergleichsweise geringen Mitteleinsatz eine möglichst große Wirkung erzielen sollen. Im Kern zielt Guerilla Marketing darauf ab, anders zu sein und aufzufallen. Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über Methoden und Instrumente des Guerilla-Marketing-Mix, die sich insbesondere (aber nicht nur) für Startups im Wettbewerb gegen etablierte, mit entsprechenden finanziellen Ressourcen ausgestattete Unternehmen eignen.

Suggested Citation

  • Nufer, Gerd, 2019. "Guerilla Marketing: Unorthodoxes Marketing von David im Kampf gegen Goliath," PraxisWISSEN Marketing: German Journal of Marketing, AfM – Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Marketing, vol. 4(01/2019), pages 69-85.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:afmpwm:261144
    DOI: 10.15459/95451.32
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    References listed on IDEAS

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