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The prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous imitation capability

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  • Tianhang Wu

    (School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China†Key Laboratory of Advanced technology of Near Space, Information System (Beihang University), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China, Beijing 100191, P. R. China)

  • Hanchen Wang

    (School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China)

  • Jian Yang

    (#x2021;China Northern Electronic Technology Institute, Beijing 100191, P. R. China)

  • Liang Xu

    (School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China†Key Laboratory of Advanced technology of Near Space, Information System (Beihang University), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China, Beijing 100191, P. R. China)

  • Yumeng Li

    (School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China†Key Laboratory of Advanced technology of Near Space, Information System (Beihang University), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China, Beijing 100191, P. R. China)

  • Jun Zhang

    (#xA7;Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, P. R. China)

Abstract

In human societies, personal heterogeneity may affect the strategy adoption capability of the individuals. In this paper, we study the effects of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation by introducing heterogeneous imitation capability of players. We design a pre-factor ωx to represent the heterogeneous learning ability of players, which is related to the degree of players. And a parameter α is used to tune the learning levels. If α>0, the learning ability of players decreases and the low-degree player has the higher reduction level, but if α<0, the learning ability of low-degree players enhances to a higher level. By carrying out extensive simulations, it reveals that the evolution of cooperation is influenced significantly by introducing player’s heterogeneous learning ability and can be promoted under the right circumstances. This finding sheds some light on the important effect of individual heterogeneity on the evolutionary game.

Suggested Citation

  • Tianhang Wu & Hanchen Wang & Jian Yang & Liang Xu & Yumeng Li & Jun Zhang, 2018. "The prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous imitation capability," International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 29(09), pages 1-11, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:ijmpcx:v:29:y:2018:i:09:n:s0129183118500778
    DOI: 10.1142/S0129183118500778
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Flores, Lucas S. & Amaral, Marco A. & Vainstein, Mendeli H. & Fernandes, Heitor C.M., 2022. "Cooperation in regular lattices," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).

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