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Market structure, consumer banking, and optimal level of service quality

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  • William E. Jackson
  • Purushottaman Nandakumar
  • Aleda V. Roth

Abstract

In this article, we use a very simple game theoretic model to investigate the influence of differing market structures, or competitive conditions, on a bank's decision to increase the level of quality of the retail, or consumer, services that it markets. The results from our model suggest that the optional level of a bank's service quality depends critically on the competitive structure of the market in which the bank operates, the degree of demand interaction between banks, and the ease of imitation of competitors' service quality innovations. We find that banks in low demand interaction markets will adopt different strategies, inducing each bank to develop its own “unique” brand of quality. It is not necessarily the case that the leading banks will lead in quality improvements. This may partially explain why some of the largest banks do not have the highest levels of consumer service quality.

Suggested Citation

  • William E. Jackson & Purushottaman Nandakumar & Aleda V. Roth, 2003. "Market structure, consumer banking, and optimal level of service quality," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 49-63.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:revfec:v:12:y:2003:i:1:p:49-63
    DOI: 10.1016/S1058-3300(03)00006-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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