IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v42y2021i4p1037-1047.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sharing managerial contract information in a vertically related market

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Kopel
  • Eva Maria Putz

Abstract

Recent research shows that in duopolies with strategic delegation, firm owners have an incentive to always share information about managerial compensation contracts. We study how sharing of contract information is affected by the presence of a supplier. We find that under quantity competition, a partial information‐sharing equilibrium may occur. Firms that share contract information punish their managers for sales to soften supplier pricing. Mandating information sharing increases total welfare but decreases consumer surplus. Under price competition, firms always want to share managerial contract information. Finally, firm profits can be higher under price competition than under quantity competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Kopel & Eva Maria Putz, 2021. "Sharing managerial contract information in a vertically related market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 1037-1047, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:42:y:2021:i:4:p:1037-1047
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3290
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3290
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/mde.3290?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), 2018. "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 17978.
    2. Lode Li & Hongtao Zhang, 2008. "Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(8), pages 1467-1481, August.
    3. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf & Dae‐Hee Yoon, 2019. "Public Disclosures in the Presence of Suppliers and Competitors," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(2), pages 758-772, June.
    4. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    5. Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), 2018. "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16873.
    6. Tiantian Gu & Nada R. Sanders & Anand Venkateswaran, 2017. "CEO Incentives and Customer-Supplier Relations," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 26(9), pages 1705-1727, September.
    7. Henrik Vetter, 2017. "Delegation and Incentives under Evolutionarily Stable Conjectures," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(6), pages 784-791, September.
    8. Pei-Cheng Liao, 2010. "Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(4), pages 263-276.
    9. Eun-Soo Park, 2002. "Vertical externality and strategic delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 137-141.
    10. Kyung Hwan Baik & Dongryul Lee, 2020. "Decisions of Duopoly Firms on Sharing Information on Their Delegation Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 145-165, August.
    11. Denis Claude, 2018. "A reconsideration of the link between vertical externality and managerial incentives," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(5), pages 526-534, July.
    12. Lode Li, 2002. "Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(9), pages 1196-1212, September.
    13. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    14. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    15. Habiger, Peter & Kopel, Michael, 2020. "Strategic delegation in successive oligopolies with differentiated firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    16. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
    17. Kai Li & Xin†Yang Liu & David Jacobson, 2018. "Information and profit sharing between a buyer and a supplier: Theory and practice," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(1), pages 79-90, January.
    18. Corona, Carlos & Nan, Lin, 2013. "Preannouncing competitive decisions in oligopoly markets," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 73-90.
    19. Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2020. "Linear demand systems for differentiated goods: Overview and user’s guide," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    20. Bernd Theilen, 2007. "Delegation and Information Sharing in Cournot Duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 21-50, September.
    21. Qihong Liu & X. Henry Wang, 2014. "Private and Social Incentives for Vertical Contract Disclosure," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(8), pages 567-573, December.
    22. Michael Kopel & Mario Pezzino, 2018. "Strategic delegation in oligopoly," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 10, pages 248-285, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael Kopel & Eva Maria Putz, 2021. "Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1645-1655, October.
    2. DongJoon Lee & Joonghwa Oh, 2022. "Strategic commitments of downstream investment firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2098-2107, September.
    3. Daehyeon Park & Doojin Ryu, 2022. "Supply chain ethics and transparency: An agent‐based model approach with Q‐learning agents," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3331-3337, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Denis Claude & Mabel Tidball, 2020. "Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Pierre-Olivier Pineau & Simon Sigué & Sihem Taboubi (ed.), Games in Management Science, pages 165-186, Springer.
    2. Habiger, Peter & Kopel, Michael, 2020. "Strategic delegation in successive oligopolies with differentiated firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    3. Yasuhiro Arai & Noriaki Matsushima, 2023. "The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 114-132, February.
    4. Michael Kopel & Eva Maria Putz, 2021. "Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1645-1655, October.
    5. Kopel, Michael & Putz, Eva Maria, 2021. "Why socially concerned firms use low-powered managerial incentives: A complementary explanation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 473-482.
    6. Xingtang Wang & Leonard F.S. Wang, 2021. "External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 134-142, January.
    7. Cong Pan & DongJoon Lee & Kangsik Choi, 2020. "Firms’ strategic delegation with heterogeneous consumers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 199-221, December.
    8. Leonard F. S. Wang & Han Wang, 2021. "Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(2), pages 127-146, October.
    9. Leonard F. S. Wang, 2020. "Relative Performance Versus Market Share Delegation in a Vertically Related Market," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 19(1), pages 16-27, June.
    10. Choi Kangsik & Lee Ki-Dong & Lim Seonyoung, 2020. "Managerial Delegation of Competing Vertical Chains with Vertical Externality," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-18, June.
    11. Cornand, Camille & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2020. "Cooperation in a differentiated duopoly when information is dispersed: A beauty contest game with endogenous concern for coordination," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 101-111.
    12. Kyung Hwan Baik & Dongryul Lee, 2020. "Decisions of Duopoly Firms on Sharing Information on Their Delegation Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(1), pages 145-165, August.
    13. DongJoon Lee & Joonghwa Oh, 2022. "Strategic commitments of downstream investment firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2098-2107, September.
    14. Dinah A. Cohen-Vernik & Li Yang & Amit Pazgal, 2022. "Strategic Delegation with Differentiated Products," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 9(3), pages 66-73, December.
    15. Bernd Theilen, 2007. "Delegation and Information Sharing in Cournot Duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 21-50, September.
    16. Nicola Meccheri, 2021. "Biased managers in vertically related markets," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(3), pages 724-736, April.
    17. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
    18. Henrik Vetter, 2020. "Incentive pay and rent in oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1621-1628, December.
    19. Arvaniti, Maria & Habla, Wolfgang, 2021. "The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    20. Pei-Cheng Liao, 2010. "Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(4), pages 263-276.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:42:y:2021:i:4:p:1037-1047. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.