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Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely repeated Dilemma Games

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  • Kenju Kamei
  • Louis Putterman

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  • Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman, 2017. "Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely repeated Dilemma Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(602), pages 1069-1095, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:602:p:1069-1095
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2017.127.issue-602
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    Cited by:

    1. Kamei, Kenju, 2017. "Endogenous reputation formation under the shadow of the future," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 189-204.
    2. Kenju Kamei, 2019. "Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 797-834, September.
    3. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "Voluntary disclosure of information and cooperation in simultaneous-move economic interactions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 234-246.
    4. Fehr, Dietmar & Sutter, Matthias, 2019. "Gossip and the efficiency of interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 448-460.
    5. Dorothée Honhon & Kyle Hyndman, 2020. "Flexibility and Reputation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 4998-5014, November.
    6. Kamei, Kenju, 2019. "Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 92097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Chuanyun Li & Xia Cao & Ming Chi, 2020. "Research on an evolutionary game model and simulation of a cluster innovation network based on fairness preference," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-17, January.
    8. Serdarevic, Nina & Strømland, Eirik & Tjøtta, Sigve, 2021. "It pays to be nice: The benefits of cooperating in markets," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    9. Nicklisch, Andreas & Putterman, Louis & Thöni, Christian, 2021. "Trigger-happy or precisionist? On demand for monitoring in peer-based public goods provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    10. Milena Tsvetkova & Claudia Wagner & Andrew Mao, 2018. "The emergence of inequality in social groups: Network structure and institutions affect the distribution of earnings in cooperation games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(7), pages 1-16, July.
    11. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "The Perverse Costly Signaling Effect on Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future," MPRA Paper 103678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Tsvetkova, Milena & Wagner, Claudia & Mao, Andrew, 2018. "The emergence of inequality in social groups: network structure and institutions affect the distribution of earnings in cooperation games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 89716, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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