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Covenants and Accounting Information in the Market for Classes of Preferred Stock

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  • DONALD J. STOKES
  • MICHAEL J. WHINCOP

Abstract

. This study investigates variations in covenants across different classes of preferred stock and describes the role of accounting numbers in such covenants. The findings indicate that covenants in contracts that protect the priority of the claims of preferred stockholders are more prevalent in very debt†like preferred stock issues when there are greater anticipated conflicts over claim priority with common stockholders. When the preferred stock issues take on common equity†like interests, there is less opportunity for common stockholders to gain from diluting the priority of the claims of the preferred stockholders. Consequently, the contracts are not configured to the same extent of restrictions on wealth transfers. Audited accounting numbers are utilized extensively in these covenants, and the contracts adjust these numbers to limit management's discretion in their choice of accounting policies for relaxing the covenants. Résumé. Les auteurs analysent les différences observées dans les clauses restrictives associées à diverses catégories d'actions privilégiées et décrivent le rôle des données comptables chiffrées dans ces clauses. Les conclusions de l'étude révèlent que les clauses restrictives des contrats qui assurent la priorité des créances des actionnaires privilégiés sont plus répandues dans les émissions d'actions privilégiées s'apparentant très étroitement à des titres d'emprunt lorsque les conflits prévus avec les actionnaires ordinaires en ce qui a trait à la priorité des créances sont plus importants. Lorsque les actions privilégiées émises s'apparentent davantage à des actions ordinaires, les actionnaires ordinaires sont moins susceptibles de tirer profit d'une dilution de la priorité des créances des actionnaires privilégiés. Par conséquent, les contrats ne sont pas structurés de façon à contenir des restrictions de même portée sur les transferts de richesse. Les données comptables vérifiées sont abondamment utilisées dans ce genre de clauses restrictives, et les contrats prévoient l'ajustement des données chiffrées de façon à limiter la discrétion dont jouit la direction dans le choix des conventions comptables susceptibles d'assouplir le caractère restrictif des clauses.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald J. Stokes & Michael J. Whincop, 1993. "Covenants and Accounting Information in the Market for Classes of Preferred Stock," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(2), pages 463-478, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:463-478
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1993.tb00892.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-591, July.
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    4. Sorensen, Eric H & Hawkins, Clark A, 1982. "The Demand for Preferred Stock with Sinking Funds and without: A Note," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 237-241, March.
    5. Heinkel, Robert & Zechner, Josef, 1990. "The Role of Debt and Perferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dean Hanlon, 2019. "Mandatory accounting change and debt covenant violation: Additional evidence from SFAS 150," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 44(3), pages 355-387, August.

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