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The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism

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  • Tiberiu Dragu
  • Mattias Polborn

Abstract

What is the role of legal limits on executive power, if any, when citizens demand more security from terrorism, and allowing executive officials legal flexibility of action appears necessary to achieve it? We develop a game‐theoretic model to show that when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and has legal flexibility to choose any policy it finds optimal, security from terrorism can actually decrease. In contrast, when the executive faces increased electoral incentives to provide security and there is an explicit legal limit on executive counterterrorism activities, security from terrorism increases. We also show that the executive achieves the objective of terrorism prevention more effectively when there are some limitations on its counterterrorism powers. The article provides a security rationale for legal limits on executive power and has implications for understanding how to design the institutional structure of liberal governments when the social objective is terrorism prevention.

Suggested Citation

  • Tiberiu Dragu & Mattias Polborn, 2014. "The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 511-525, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:58:y:2014:i:2:p:511-525
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12061
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    Cited by:

    1. Haritz Garro, 2019. "Terrorism prevention with reelection concerns and valence competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 330-369, July.
    2. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Negotiation statements with promise and threat," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 149-164, June.
    3. Artyom Jelnov, 2019. "Note on terrorist factions and their interactions with governments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 1318-1326.
    4. Tiberiu Dragu, 2017. "On repression and its effectiveness," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 599-622, October.
    5. Kolb, Aaron & Conitzer, Vincent, 2020. "Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    6. Michael Gibilisco, 2023. "Mowing the grass," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 204-231, July.
    7. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2018. "Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 112-114.
    8. Elena V McLean & Kaisa H Hinkkainen & Luis De la Calle & Navin A Bapat, 2018. "Economic sanctions and the dynamics of terrorist campaigns," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(4), pages 378-401, July.
    9. Shahzad, Umer & Sarwar, Suleman & Farooq, Muhammad Umar & Qin, Fengming, 2020. "USAID, official development assistance and counter terrorism efforts: Pre and post 9/11 analysis for South Asia," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).

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