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Tropical Deforestation: Markets and Market Failures


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  • Todd Sandler


Activities to curb deforestation yield private goods, country-specific public goods, and global public goods. Markets can operate for the private goods, while nations are motivated to strike bargains with one another over country-specific public goods. Suboptimality stems from the global public goods and the positive externalities associated with preservation activities. This suboptimality can be attenuated if the developed countries establish property rights to genetic material gathered from the rain forests. Since much of the global public benefits is derived by the developed countries, they are in a weak bargaining position with respect to the shrinking rain forests.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.

Volume (Year): 69 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 225-233

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Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:69:y:1993:i:3:p:225-233

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Cited by:
  1. Robert Kohn, 1995. "Salvatore model with equiproportional preservation of forests," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 63-79, January.
  2. Oliver Deke, 2004. "Financing National Protected Area Networks Internationally � The Global Environment Facility as a Multilateral Mechanism of Transfer," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy 1227, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  3. Chambers, Paul E. & Jensen, Richard & Whitehead, John C., 1996. "Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 135-146, November.
  4. Kant, Shashi, 2003. "Extending the boundaries of forest economics," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 39-56, January.
  5. Nick Hanley & Clive Spash & Lorna Walker, 1994. "Problems in Valuing the Benefits of Biodiversity Protection," Working Papers Series, University of Stirling, Division of Economics 94/8, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  6. Oliver Deke, 2004. "Internalizing Global Externalities from Biodiversity � Protected Areas and Multilateral Mechanisms of Transfer," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy 1226, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  7. Thiele, Rainer, 1994. "Conserving tropical rain forests in Indonesia: a CGE analysis of alternative policies," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy 621, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  8. Farley, Josh & Aquino, André & Daniels, Amy & Moulaert, Azur & Lee, Dan & Krause, Abby, 2010. "Global mechanisms for sustaining and enhancing PES schemes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(11), pages 2075-2084, September.


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