Agency and Corporate Investment: The Role of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance
AbstractThe agency theory of the firm implies that executive incentive compensation and corporate investment policies are endogenously determined. We estimate jointly the relationship between long-term corporate investment and CEO incentive compensation structure, while considering the strength of corporate governance mechanisms. The analysis indicates that long-term business investment is positively related to the weight placed on equity-based incentive compensation, after controlling for internal financing constraints and the quality of the investment opportunity set. We also confirm that CEO compensation structure is influenced by factors that represent the strength of the firm's internal governance mechanisms.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 79 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/
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- Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sharma, Zenu, 2011. "Incentives and innovation: evidence from CEO compensation contracts," Research Discussion Papers 17/2011, Bank of Finland.
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