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Should Speculators Be Taxed?

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  • Dow, James
  • Rahi, Rohit

Abstract

A number of economists have supported the taxation of speculation in financial markets. We examine the welfare economics of such a tax in a model of a financial market where some agents have superior information and others have a hedging motive. We show that a tax on speculators may actually increase speculative profits. This occurs if the speculators' benefit from less-informative prices offsets the cost of the tax. The effect on the welfare of other agents depends on how information revelation changes risk-sharing opportunities. It is possible for the introduction of a tax to cause a Pareto improvement. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.

Volume (Year): 73 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 89-107

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:73:y:2000:i:1:p:89-107

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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/

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Cited by:
  1. Giovanni Cespa, 2000. "Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity," Economics Working Papers 520, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2002.
  2. Foucault, Thierry & Sraer, David & Thesmar, David, 2008. "Individual Investors and Volatility," CEPR Discussion Papers 6915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Chiaki Hara, 2013. "Asset Prices, Trading Volumes, and Investor Welfare in Markets with Transaction Costs," KIER Working Papers 862, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Hara, Chiaki, 2012. "Asset prices, trading volumes, and investor welfare in markets with transaction costs," CIS Discussion paper series 556, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. CITANNA, Alessandro & POLEMARCHAKIS, Herakles M. & TIRELLI, Mario, 2001. "The taxation of trades in assets," CORE Discussion Papers 2001017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Dominique Dupont & Gabriel Lee, 2007. "Effects of Securities Transaction Taxes on Depth and Bid-Ask Spread," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 393-400, May.
  7. Huber, Jürgen & Kleinlercher, Daniel & Kirchler, Michael, 2012. "The impact of a financial transaction tax on stylized facts of price returns—Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1248-1266.
  8. Dimitri Vayanos & Jiang Wang, 2012. "Liquidity and Asset Returns under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition," FMG Discussion Papers dp708, Financial Markets Group.
  9. Huber, Jürgen & Kirchler, Michael & Kleinlercher, Daniel & Sutter, Matthias, 2014. "Market vs. Residence Principle: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of a Financial Transaction Tax," IZA Discussion Papers 7978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Alexander Gümbel, 2005. "Should short-term speculators be taxed, or subsidised?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 327-348, 08.
  11. Jürgen Antony & Michiel Bijlsma & Adam Elbourne & Marcel Lever & Gijsbert Zwart, 2012. "Financial transaction tax: review and assessment," CPB Discussion Paper 202, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  12. Hanke, Michael & Huber, Jürgen & Kirchler, Michael & Sutter, Matthias, 2010. "The economic consequences of a Tobin tax--An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(1-2), pages 58-71, May.
  13. Kirchler, Michael & Huber, Jürgen & Kleinlercher, Daniel, 2011. "Market microstructure matters when imposing a Tobin tax—Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 586-602.
  14. James Dow & Gary Gorton, 2006. "Noise Traders," NBER Working Papers 12256, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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