Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory When Shareholders Own More Than One Share
AbstractTendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares are studied in the laboratory to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process. Tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level. Contrary to game-theoretic predictions, bid level and bid type affect the number of shares tendered and the bid success rate. When players are given unequal endowments of shares, an equal proportion strategy organizes the data better than B. Holmstrom and B. Nalebuff's (1992) symmetric focal equilibrium in which larger shareholders tender down to a common share level. However, large shareholders often tender proportionately more shares than small shareholders. Copyright 1998 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 71 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/
Other versions of this item:
- Cadsby, C.B. & Maynes, E., 1998. "Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Shareholders Own More than One Share," Working Papers 1998-3, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Scott Barrett, 2007. "The Smallpox Eradication Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 179-207, January.
- Bram Cadsby, C. & Maynes, Elizabeth, 2005. "Gender, risk aversion, and the drawing power of equilibrium in an experimental corporate takeover game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 39-59, January.
- Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 2006.
"Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 32-49, March.
- Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.