Rights as Signals
AbstractBecause rights operate as trumps over normal governmental interests, they have an inherent cost. Consequently, by entrenching protection for human rights, governments can signal a willingness to give up power in the short term to obtain long-term benefits. Investors can infer from this that the government has a low discount rate and is less likely to pose a threat of expropriation. Similarly, when courts vigorously enforce human rights, they dramatize their judicial independence, which is valuable to investors, who themselves may have no interest in human rights. Thus, human rights enforcement may help encourage investment and thereby indirectly foster economic growth. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 31 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, 2009. "Constitutions and economic reforms in transition: an empirical study," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 1-41, March.
- Stefan Voigt, 2011.
"Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments,"
Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
- Stefan Voigt, 2009. "Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Vinod, Hrishikesh D., 2006. "Should Asians demand both entrepreneurship and human rights?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 14-28, February.
- Goderis, B.V.G. & Versteeg, M., 2013. "The Transnational Origins of Constituions: Evidence From a New Global Data Set On Constitional Rights," Discussion Paper 2013-010, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.