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Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

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  • Sandholm, William H.

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin)

  • Hofbauer, Josef

    ()
    (Department of Mathematics, University of Vienna)

Abstract

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:771

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Web page: http://econtheory.org

Related research

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; evolutionary game dynamics; nonconvergnece; dominated strategies;

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As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. “Survival of Dominated Strategies Under Evolutionary Dynamics,” J. Hofbauer & W. Sandholm (2011)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2012-09-06 06:00:48
  2. “Survival of Dominated Strategies Under Evolutionary Dynamics,” J. Hofbauer & W. Sandholm (2011)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2012-09-06 06:00:48
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Cited by:
  1. Yannick Viossat, 2012. "Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria," Working Papers hal-00756096, HAL.
  2. Segismundo S. Izquierdo & Luis R. Izquierdo, 2011. "Strictly Dominated Strategies in the Replicator-Mutator Dynamics," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(3), pages 355-364, September.
  3. Laraki, Rida & Mertikopoulos, Panayotis, 2013. "Higher order game dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2666-2695.
  4. Itai Arieli & H Peyton Young, 2011. "Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games," Economics Series Working Papers 570, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Michel Benaïm & Josef Hofbauer & Sylvain Sorin, 2012. "Perturbations of Set-Valued Dynamical Systems, with Applications to Game Theory," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 195-205, June.

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