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The (impossible) repo trinity: the political economy of repo markets

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  • Daniela Gabor

Abstract

In its capacity as debt issuer, the state has played a growing role in financial life over the last 30 years. To examine this role and connect it to shadow banking, the paper develops the concept of the ‘repo trinity’, which captures a set of policy objectives that central banks outlined after the 1998 Russian crisis, the first systemic crisis of collateral-based finance. The repo trinity connected financial stability with liquid government bond markets and free repo markets. It further reinforced the dominance of the US government bond market as institutional template for states adjusting to a world of independent central banks, market-based financing and global competition for liquidity. Central banks and the Financial Stability Board recognized the impossible nature of the trinity after 2008, attributing cyclical leverage (financial instability) and elusive liquidity in collateral markets to deregulated repo markets, markets systemic to shadow banking. The new approach triggered radical changes in crisis central banking but has not powered significant regulatory interventions in the absence of an alternative mode of organizing government bond markets.

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  • Daniela Gabor, 2016. "The (impossible) repo trinity: the political economy of repo markets," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(6), pages 967-1000, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:23:y:2016:i:6:p:967-1000
    DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1207699
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ricks, Morgan, 2016. "The Money Problem," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226330327, November.
    2. Blyth, Mark, 2013. "Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199828302.
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    Cited by:

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    6. Gabor, Daniela, 2020. "The Wall Street Consensus," SocArXiv wab8m, Center for Open Science.
    7. Arbogast, Tobias, 2020. "Who are these bond vigilantes anyway? The political economy of sovereign debt ownership in the eurozone," MPIfG Discussion Paper 20/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    8. Daniela Gabor, 2018. "Goodbye (Chinese) Shadow Banking, Hello Market†based Finance," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 49(2), pages 394-419, March.
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    13. Leon Wansleben, 2021. "Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 909-932, July.
    14. Stefan Angrick, 2018. "Structural conditions for currency internationalization: international finance and the survival constraint," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(5), pages 699-725, September.
    15. Diessner, Sebastian & Lisi, Giulio, 2019. "Masters of the ‘masters of the universe’? Monetary, fiscal and financial dominance in the Eurozone," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100754, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Thiemann Matthias, 2021. "The Political Economy of Private Law: Comment on ‘The code of capital – how the law creates wealth and inequality’," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 37-51, March.
    17. Steffen Murau & Alexandru-Stefan Goghie & Matteo Giordano, 2024. "Encumbered Security? Conceptualising Vertical and Horizontal Repos in the Euro Area," Working Papers 262, Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, UK.
    18. Ann E. Davis, 2023. "Ukraine War: Policy Miscalculations or Contradictions of Capitalism?," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 557-567, December.
    19. Bajaj, Vimmy & Kumar, Pawan & Singh, Vipul Kumar, 2022. "Linkage dynamics of sovereign credit risk and financial markets: A bibliometric analysis," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    20. Pape, Fabian & Petry, Johannes, 2023. "East Asia and the politics of global finance: a developmental challenge to the neoliberal consensus?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118296, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    21. Engelbert Stockhammer & Stefano Sgambati & Anastasia Nesvetailova, 2021. "Financialisation: continuity and change— introduction to the special issue," Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 389-401, December.
    22. Walter, Timo & Wansleben, Leon, 2018. "How Central Bankers Learned to Love Financialization: The Fed, the Bank, and the Enlisting of Unfettered Markets in the Conduct of Monetary Policy," OSF Preprints gzyp6, Center for Open Science.
    23. Jakob Vestergaard & Daniela Gabor, 2021. "Central Banks Caught Between Market Liquidity and Fiscal Disciplining: A Money View Perspective on Collateral Policy," Working Papers Series inetwp170, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    24. Pape, Fabian & Rommerskirchen, Charlotte, 2024. "Co-working in the collateral factory: analyzing the infrastructural entanglements of public debt management, central banking, and primary dealer systems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121407, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    25. Scott James & Lucia Quaglia, 2023. "Epistemic contestation and interagency conflict: The challenge of regulating investment funds," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 346-362, April.

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