States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises
AbstractThis paper seeks to overcome an antinomy within the theory of political economy: while market outcomes are treated as resulting from polycentric competition, political outcomes are treated as resulting from hierarchic planning. We seek to overcome this antinomy by treating political outcomes as likewise resulting from polycentric competition, taking due account of relevant institutional differences. For example, a parliamentary assembly is treated as an extra-ordinary form of investment bank that intermediates between the sponsors of enterprises and those within the citizenry who have means to support those enterprises. What results is a theory in which political programs emerge in largely bottom-up fashion through complex networks of transactions. Much of the inspiration for this paper arises from the Italian School of Public Finance, particularly Mazzola, Montemartini, Pantaleoni and de Viti de Marco.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Review of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 23 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRPE20
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Richard Wagner, 2012. "Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 261-277, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.