Dynamics of Mixed Coalitions Under Social Cohesion Constraints
AbstractThe performance to a collective task may require a certain degree of cooperation among agents. Is cooperation viable in the sense that individual needs are fulfilled, compromises are possible and the task is performed? A model of cooperation is presented in which compromises are also ruled by cohesion among agents. Viability conditions are found associated with regulation law. They say that cooperation increases with cohesion. Moreover, reducing the rapidity of change of cooperation and lowering dissident behavior correct the dynamics so as to turn non viable states into viable ones.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Mathematical Population Studies.
Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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